“像做生意一樣對(duì)待投資，是最聰明的?！?-本·格雷厄姆，《聰明的投資者》
引用本·格雷厄姆的話作為這封信的開(kāi)場(chǎng)白是合適的，因?yàn)槲液芨屑つ軓乃橇私獾疥P(guān)于投資的想法。我在后面會(huì)談到本，甚至很快會(huì)談到普通股，但首先我想和你聊聊，在很久以前我曾做過(guò)的兩個(gè)小小的非股票投資。盡管它們都沒(méi)有明顯地改變我的凈值，但還是能帶來(lái)些啟發(fā)的.
這故事始于1973至1981年的內(nèi)布拉斯加州，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)中西部的農(nóng)場(chǎng)價(jià)格暴漲，因?yàn)榇蠹移毡檎J(rèn)為惡性通貨膨脹要來(lái)了，而且小鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)銀行的貸款政策還火上澆油。然后泡沫爆了，導(dǎo)致價(jià)格下跌50%甚至更多，摧毀了那些舉債經(jīng)營(yíng)的農(nóng)民和他們的債主。在那場(chǎng)泡沫余波中倒閉的愛(ài)荷華州和內(nèi)布拉斯加州的銀行，數(shù)量比我們最近這次大蕭條中倒閉的還要多五倍。
在1986年，我從FDIC（聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司）那買(mǎi)下了一個(gè)400英畝的農(nóng)場(chǎng)，坐落在奧馬哈北部50英里處。這花了我28萬(wàn)，此價(jià)格比前幾年一家倒閉了的銀行批給農(nóng)場(chǎng)的貸款還要少得多。我根本不懂怎樣去經(jīng)營(yíng)一個(gè)農(nóng)場(chǎng)，好在有個(gè)熱愛(ài)農(nóng)活的兒子。我從他那得知這農(nóng)場(chǎng)能生產(chǎn)多少蒲式耳的玉米和大豆，經(jīng)營(yíng)費(fèi)用會(huì)是多少。通過(guò)這些預(yù)估，我計(jì)算出這農(nóng)場(chǎng)當(dāng)時(shí)大概能有10%的正?；貓?bào)。我還認(rèn)為生產(chǎn)力會(huì)隨時(shí)間而提高，農(nóng)作物價(jià)格也會(huì)越來(lái)越高。后來(lái)這些預(yù)期都得到了印證。
我不需要有與眾不同的知識(shí)或智商來(lái)得出結(jié)論，這項(xiàng)投資不會(huì)有向下的趨勢(shì)，而是有潛在的，會(huì)實(shí)質(zhì)向好的趨勢(shì)。當(dāng)然了，可能偶爾會(huì)歉收，或是價(jià)格有時(shí)讓人失望。那又如何？總會(huì)有些非常好的年份嘛，我完全不會(huì)有任何壓力去賣(mài)掉這塊資產(chǎn)?，F(xiàn)在，28年過(guò)去了，這農(nóng)場(chǎng)的收入翻了三倍，它的價(jià)值已是我支付價(jià)格的五倍甚至更多。我還是對(duì)農(nóng)活一無(wú)所知，最近才第二次去實(shí)地看了看。
在1993年，我做了另外一個(gè)小投資。那時(shí)我還是所羅門(mén)的CEO，所羅門(mén)的房東賴(lài)瑞·西弗史丹告訴我，有個(gè)清算信托公司打算要賣(mài)掉紐約大學(xué)鄰近的一塊商業(yè)地產(chǎn)。泡沫再次爆破了，這次波及到商業(yè)地產(chǎn)，這個(gè)清算信托公司專(zhuān)門(mén)用于處置那些倒閉儲(chǔ)蓄機(jī)構(gòu)的資產(chǎn)，正是這些機(jī)構(gòu)樂(lè)觀的貸款政策助長(zhǎng)了這場(chǎng)鬧劇。
這里的分析依舊簡(jiǎn)單。就像那農(nóng)場(chǎng)的例子中，該資產(chǎn)的無(wú)杠桿當(dāng)期收益率大約為10%。但資產(chǎn)正被清算信托公司低效率經(jīng)營(yíng)著，如果把一些空置的商店出租，它的收入將會(huì)增加。更重要的是，占地產(chǎn)項(xiàng)目約20%面積的最大租戶支付的租金大約為5美元一英尺，而其他租戶平均為70美元。9年后，這份廉價(jià)租約的到期肯定會(huì)帶來(lái)收入的顯著增長(zhǎng)。這資產(chǎn)的位置也是極好的，畢竟紐約大學(xué)跑不了。
我加入了一個(gè)小團(tuán)體來(lái)收購(gòu)這棟樓，賴(lài)瑞和佛瑞德·羅斯也在其中。佛瑞德是個(gè)有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的高級(jí)房地產(chǎn)投資者，他和他的家族將管理這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)。這些年也確實(shí)由他們經(jīng)營(yíng)著。隨著舊租約的到期，收入翻了三倍，現(xiàn)在的年分紅已超過(guò)我們初始投資額的35%。此外，原始抵押分別在1996年和1999年被再融資，這種手段允許進(jìn)行了幾次特別分紅，加起來(lái)超過(guò)了我們投資額度的150%。我到今天為止還沒(méi)去看過(guò)這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)。
從那農(nóng)場(chǎng)和紐約大學(xué)房地產(chǎn)獲得的收入，很可能未來(lái)幾十年內(nèi)還會(huì)增長(zhǎng)。盡管收益并不具有戲劇性，但這兩項(xiàng)投資卻是可靠且令人滿意的，我會(huì)一輩子持有，然后傳給我的孩子和孫子。
這故事始于1973至1981年的內(nèi)布拉斯加州，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)中西部的農(nóng)場(chǎng)價(jià)格暴漲，因?yàn)榇蠹移毡檎J(rèn)為惡性通貨膨脹要來(lái)了，而且小鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)銀行的貸款政策還火上澆油。然后泡沫爆了，導(dǎo)致價(jià)格下跌50%甚至更多，摧毀了那些舉債經(jīng)營(yíng)的農(nóng)民和他們的債主。在那場(chǎng)泡沫余波中倒閉的愛(ài)荷華州和內(nèi)布拉斯加州的銀行，數(shù)量比我們最近這次大蕭條中倒閉的還要多五倍。
在1986年，我從FDIC（聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司）那買(mǎi)下了一個(gè)400英畝的農(nóng)場(chǎng)，坐落在奧馬哈北部50英里處。這花了我28萬(wàn)，此價(jià)格比前幾年一家倒閉了的銀行批給農(nóng)場(chǎng)的貸款還要少得多。我根本不懂怎樣去經(jīng)營(yíng)一個(gè)農(nóng)場(chǎng)，好在有個(gè)熱愛(ài)農(nóng)活的兒子。我從他那得知這農(nóng)場(chǎng)能生產(chǎn)多少蒲式耳的玉米和大豆，經(jīng)營(yíng)費(fèi)用會(huì)是多少。通過(guò)這些預(yù)估，我計(jì)算出這農(nóng)場(chǎng)當(dāng)時(shí)大概能有10%的正常回報(bào)。我還認(rèn)為生產(chǎn)力會(huì)隨時(shí)間而提高，農(nóng)作物價(jià)格也會(huì)越來(lái)越高。后來(lái)這些預(yù)期都得到了印證。
我不需要有與眾不同的知識(shí)或智商來(lái)得出結(jié)論，這項(xiàng)投資不會(huì)有向下的趨勢(shì)，而是有潛在的，會(huì)實(shí)質(zhì)向好的趨勢(shì)。當(dāng)然了，可能偶爾會(huì)歉收，或是價(jià)格有時(shí)讓人失望。那又如何？總會(huì)有些非常好的年份嘛，我完全不會(huì)有任何壓力去賣(mài)掉這塊資產(chǎn)?，F(xiàn)在，28年過(guò)去了，這農(nóng)場(chǎng)的收入翻了三倍，它的價(jià)值已是我支付價(jià)格的五倍甚至更多。我還是對(duì)農(nóng)活一無(wú)所知，最近才第二次去實(shí)地看了看。
在1993年，我做了另外一個(gè)小投資。那時(shí)我還是所羅門(mén)的CEO，所羅門(mén)的房東賴(lài)瑞·西弗史丹告訴我，有個(gè)清算信托公司打算要賣(mài)掉紐約大學(xué)鄰近的一塊商業(yè)地產(chǎn)。泡沫再次爆破了，這次波及到商業(yè)地產(chǎn)，這個(gè)清算信托公司專(zhuān)門(mén)用于處置那些倒閉儲(chǔ)蓄機(jī)構(gòu)的資產(chǎn)，正是這些機(jī)構(gòu)樂(lè)觀的貸款政策助長(zhǎng)了這場(chǎng)鬧劇。
這里的分析依舊簡(jiǎn)單。就像那農(nóng)場(chǎng)的例子中，該資產(chǎn)的無(wú)杠桿當(dāng)期收益率大約為10%。但資產(chǎn)正被清算信托公司低效率經(jīng)營(yíng)著，如果把一些空置的商店出租，它的收入將會(huì)增加。更重要的是，占地產(chǎn)項(xiàng)目約20%面積的最大租戶支付的租金大約為5美元一英尺，而其他租戶平均為70美元。9年后，這份廉價(jià)租約的到期肯定會(huì)帶來(lái)收入的顯著增長(zhǎng)。這資產(chǎn)的位置也是極好的，畢竟紐約大學(xué)跑不了。
我加入了一個(gè)小團(tuán)體來(lái)收購(gòu)這棟樓，賴(lài)瑞和佛瑞德·羅斯也在其中。佛瑞德是個(gè)有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的高級(jí)房地產(chǎn)投資者，他和他的家族將管理這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)。這些年也確實(shí)由他們經(jīng)營(yíng)著。隨著舊租約的到期，收入翻了三倍，現(xiàn)在的年分紅已超過(guò)我們初始投資額的35%。此外，原始抵押分別在1996年和1999年被再融資，這種手段允許進(jìn)行了幾次特別分紅，加起來(lái)超過(guò)了我們投資額度的150%。我到今天為止還沒(méi)去看過(guò)這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)。
從那農(nóng)場(chǎng)和紐約大學(xué)房地產(chǎn)獲得的收入，很可能未來(lái)幾十年內(nèi)還會(huì)增長(zhǎng)。盡管收益并不具有戲劇性，但這兩項(xiàng)投資卻是可靠且令人滿意的，我會(huì)一輩子持有，然后傳給我的孩子和孫子。
我說(shuō)這些故事是為了闡明一些投資的基礎(chǔ)原則：
· 獲得令人滿意的投資回報(bào)并不需要你成為一名專(zhuān)家。但如果你不是，你必須認(rèn)清自己的局限性并遵循一套可行的方法。保持簡(jiǎn)單，不要孤注一擲。當(dāng)別人向你承諾短期的暴利，你要學(xué)會(huì)趕緊說(shuō)“不”。
· 聚焦于擬投資資產(chǎn)的未來(lái)生產(chǎn)力。如果你對(duì)某資產(chǎn)的未來(lái)收入進(jìn)行了粗略估算，卻又感到不安，那就忘了它繼續(xù)前進(jìn)吧。沒(méi)人能估算出每一項(xiàng)投資的可能性。但沒(méi)必要當(dāng)個(gè)全能者；你只要能理解自己的所作所為就可以了。
· 如果你是聚焦于擬投資資產(chǎn)的未來(lái)價(jià)格變動(dòng)，那你就是在投機(jī)。這本身沒(méi)什么錯(cuò)。但我知道我無(wú)法成功投機(jī)，并對(duì)那些宣傳自己能持續(xù)成功的投機(jī)者表示懷疑。有一半人第一次扔銅板時(shí)能壓對(duì)寶；但這些勝利者如果繼續(xù)玩下去，沒(méi)人能擁有贏利為正的期望值。事實(shí)上，一項(xiàng)既定資產(chǎn)最近的價(jià)格上漲，永遠(yuǎn)都不會(huì)是買(mǎi)入的理由。
· 通過(guò)我的兩個(gè)小投資可以看出，我只會(huì)考慮一項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)能產(chǎn)出什么，而完全不關(guān)心它們的每日定價(jià)。聚焦于賽場(chǎng)的人才能贏得比賽，勝者不會(huì)是那些緊盯記分板的人。如果你能好好享受周六周日而不看股價(jià)，那工作日也試試吧。
· 形成自己的宏觀觀點(diǎn)，或是聽(tīng)別人對(duì)宏觀或市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)，都是在浪費(fèi)時(shí)間。事實(shí)上這是危險(xiǎn)的，因?yàn)檫@可能會(huì)模糊你的視野，讓你看不清真正重要的事實(shí)。（當(dāng)我聽(tīng)到電視評(píng)論員油嘴滑舌地對(duì)市場(chǎng)未來(lái)走勢(shì)進(jìn)行臆想，我就回想起了米奇·曼托的尖酸評(píng)論：“你都不知道這游戲有多簡(jiǎn)單，直到你走進(jìn)那個(gè)演播廳?！保?
我的兩項(xiàng)購(gòu)買(mǎi)分別是在1986年和1993年完成。決定進(jìn)行這些投資的時(shí)候，當(dāng)時(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況、利率或是下一年（1987和1994年）的證券市場(chǎng)走勢(shì)，對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)都不重要。我已經(jīng)記不起當(dāng)時(shí)的頭條新聞，或是權(quán)威人士說(shuō)了些什么，不管別人怎么說(shuō)，內(nèi)布拉斯加州的玉米一直在生長(zhǎng)，學(xué)生也會(huì)聚集在紐約大學(xué)。
在我的兩個(gè)小投資和股票投資之間，有個(gè)重要的區(qū)別。那就是股票會(huì)讓你知道所持股份的實(shí)時(shí)定價(jià)，而我卻從沒(méi)見(jiàn)過(guò)對(duì)我農(nóng)場(chǎng)或紐約房地產(chǎn)的報(bào)價(jià)。
證券市場(chǎng)的投資者有個(gè)極大的優(yōu)勢(shì)，那就是他們的持股有寬幅波動(dòng)的估值。對(duì)于一些投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，確實(shí)如此。畢竟，如果一個(gè)穆迪的朋友，每天圍著我的財(cái)產(chǎn)對(duì)我喊出報(bào)價(jià)，愿意以此報(bào)價(jià)來(lái)買(mǎi)我的農(nóng)場(chǎng)，或?qū)⑺霓r(nóng)場(chǎng)賣(mài)給我，并且這些報(bào)價(jià)會(huì)根據(jù)他的精神狀態(tài)，在短期內(nèi)劇烈變化，我到底該怎樣利用他這種不規(guī)律的行為來(lái)獲利？如果他的日?qǐng)?bào)價(jià)令人可笑地低，并且我有閑錢(qián)，我就會(huì)買(mǎi)下他的農(nóng)場(chǎng)。如果他喊出的報(bào)價(jià)荒謬地高，我要么就賣(mài)給他，或是繼續(xù)耕種。
然而，股票的持有者往往容易被其他持股者的反復(fù)無(wú)常和不理性所影響，搞到自己也不理性。因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)上的噪音太多了，包括經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況、利率、股票的價(jià)格等等。一些投資者認(rèn)為聽(tīng)權(quán)威人士的意見(jiàn)很重要，更糟糕的是，還認(rèn)為參考他們的評(píng)論來(lái)投資很重要。
那些擁有農(nóng)場(chǎng)或房子的人，能夠默默持有資產(chǎn)幾十年，但當(dāng)他們接觸到大量的股票報(bào)價(jià)，加上評(píng)論員總在暗示“別一直坐著，來(lái)買(mǎi)賣(mài)吧！”，他們往往就會(huì)變得狂熱起來(lái)。對(duì)于這些投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，流動(dòng)性本來(lái)是可以擁有的絕對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)，現(xiàn)在卻變成了一種詛咒。
一個(gè)閃電崩盤(pán)或是其他極端的市場(chǎng)震蕩，對(duì)投資者所造成的傷害，并不會(huì)比一個(gè)古怪且愛(ài)說(shuō)話的鄰居對(duì)我農(nóng)場(chǎng)投資的傷害來(lái)得大。事實(shí)上，下跌的市場(chǎng)對(duì)真正的投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，是有幫助的，如果當(dāng)價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)低于價(jià)值的時(shí)候，他手里還有錢(qián)可用的話。在投資的時(shí)候，恐懼的氛圍是你的朋友；一個(gè)歡快的世界卻是你的敵人。
在2008年底發(fā)生的，嚴(yán)重的金融恐慌期間，即使一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻衰退正在明顯地形成，我也從未想過(guò)要賣(mài)出我的農(nóng)場(chǎng)或是紐約房地產(chǎn)。如果我100%擁有一項(xiàng)具良好長(zhǎng)期前景的穩(wěn)固生意，對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)，哪怕是稍微考慮要拋售它，都會(huì)是非常愚蠢的。我持有的股票就是好生意的一小部分，那為什么要賣(mài)出呢？準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)，每一小部分或許最后會(huì)讓人失望，但作為一個(gè)整體，他們一定能做好。難道有人真的相信，地球會(huì)吞沒(méi)美國(guó)驚人的生產(chǎn)性資產(chǎn)和無(wú)限的人類(lèi)創(chuàng)造性？
當(dāng)查理·芒格和我買(mǎi)股票時(shí)，我們會(huì)把它當(dāng)成是生意的一部分，我們的分析與買(mǎi)下整個(gè)生意時(shí)所思考的內(nèi)容非常相似。我們一開(kāi)始會(huì)判斷自己能否容易地估計(jì)出，資產(chǎn)未來(lái)五年或更久的收入范圍。如果答案是肯定的，并且處于與我們估算底線相對(duì)應(yīng)的合理價(jià)格內(nèi)，我們就會(huì)購(gòu)買(mǎi)這股票（或生意）。但是，如果我們沒(méi)有能力估算出未來(lái)的收入（經(jīng)常會(huì)遇到這種情況），我們就會(huì)簡(jiǎn)單地繼續(xù)前行，繼續(xù)尋找下一個(gè)潛在標(biāo)的。在我們一起合作的54年里，我們從未因宏觀或政治環(huán)境，或其他人的看法，而放棄具有吸引力的收購(gòu)。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)我們做決定時(shí)，這類(lèi)因素想都沒(méi)想過(guò)。
但至關(guān)重要的是，我們認(rèn)清了自身的能力圈邊界，并乖乖地呆在里面。即使這樣，我們還是在股票上和生意上都犯了些錯(cuò)誤。但它們發(fā)生時(shí)都不是災(zāi)難型的，例如在一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期上升的市場(chǎng)中，基于預(yù)期價(jià)格行為和欲望導(dǎo)致了購(gòu)買(mǎi)。
當(dāng)然，大多數(shù)投資者并沒(méi)有把商業(yè)前景研究當(dāng)作是生活中的首要任務(wù)。如果夠明智的話，他們會(huì)知道自己對(duì)具體生意的了解不足，并不能預(yù)測(cè)出他們未來(lái)的獲利能力。
我給這些非專(zhuān)業(yè)人士帶來(lái)了好消息：典型的投資者并不需要這些技巧?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，美國(guó)的商業(yè)一直做得很好，以后也會(huì)繼續(xù)好下去（然而可以肯定的是，會(huì)有不可預(yù)測(cè)的忽冷忽熱出現(xiàn)）。在20世紀(jì)，道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)從66上漲到11497，不斷上升的股利支付推動(dòng)了市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。21世紀(jì)，將可以看到更多的盈利，幾乎必然會(huì)有大量的收獲。非專(zhuān)業(yè)人士的目標(biāo)不應(yīng)是挑選出大牛股，他或他的外援都是辦不到的，但應(yīng)該持有各種生意的一部分，總的合起來(lái)就會(huì)有很好的表現(xiàn)。一個(gè)低成本的S&P500指數(shù)基金就能滿足這個(gè)目標(biāo)。
這是對(duì)非專(zhuān)業(yè)人士說(shuō)的“投資是什么”。“什么時(shí)候投資”也是很重要的。最危險(xiǎn)的是膽小的或新手的投資者在市場(chǎng)極度繁榮的時(shí)候入場(chǎng)，然后看到賬面虧損了才醒悟。（想起巴頓·比格斯最近的觀察：“牛市就像性愛(ài)，在結(jié)束前的感覺(jué)最好?！保┩顿Y者解決這類(lèi)錯(cuò)時(shí)交易的方法是，在一段長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi)積攢股份，并永遠(yuǎn)不要在出現(xiàn)壞消息和股價(jià)遠(yuǎn)低于高點(diǎn)時(shí)賣(mài)出。遵循這些原則，“什么都不懂”的投資者不僅做到了多樣化投資，還能保持成本最小化，這幾乎就能確信，可以獲得令人滿意的結(jié)果。實(shí)際上，相對(duì)于那些知識(shí)淵博，但連自身弱點(diǎn)都看不清的專(zhuān)業(yè)投資者，一個(gè)能實(shí)事求是面對(duì)自己短處的純樸投資者可能會(huì)獲得更好的長(zhǎng)期回報(bào)。
如果“投資者”瘋狂買(mǎi)賣(mài)彼此的農(nóng)地，產(chǎn)量和農(nóng)作物的價(jià)格都不會(huì)增長(zhǎng)。這些行為的唯一結(jié)果就是，由于農(nóng)場(chǎng)擁有者尋求建議和轉(zhuǎn)換資產(chǎn)屬性而導(dǎo)致的大量的成本，會(huì)使總的收入下降。
然而，那些能從提供建議或產(chǎn)生交易中獲利的人，一直在催促個(gè)人和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者要變得積極。這導(dǎo)致的摩擦成本變得很高，對(duì)于投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，總體是全無(wú)好處的。所以，忽視這些噪音吧，保持你的成本最小化，投資那些股票就像投資你愿意投資的農(nóng)場(chǎng)一樣。
我該補(bǔ)充一下，我的財(cái)富就在我嘴里：我在這里提出的建議，本質(zhì)上與我在遺囑里列出的一些指令是相同的。通過(guò)一個(gè)遺囑，去實(shí)現(xiàn)把現(xiàn)金交給守護(hù)我老婆利益的托管人。我對(duì)托管人的建議再簡(jiǎn)單不過(guò)了：把10%的現(xiàn)金用來(lái)買(mǎi)短期政府債券，把90%用于購(gòu)買(mǎi)非常低成本的S&P500指數(shù)基金（我建議是先鋒基金VFINX）。我相信遵循這些方針的信托，能比聘用昂貴投資經(jīng)理的大多數(shù)投資者，獲得更優(yōu)的長(zhǎng)期回報(bào)，無(wú)論是養(yǎng)老基金、機(jī)構(gòu)還是個(gè)人。
現(xiàn)在說(shuō)回本·格雷厄姆。我在1949年買(mǎi)了本所著的《聰明的投資者》，并通過(guò)書(shū)中的投資探討，學(xué)到了他大部分的想法。我的金融生涯隨著買(mǎi)到的這本書(shū)而改變了。
在讀本的書(shū)之前，我仍在投資的環(huán)境外徘徊，鯨吞著所有關(guān)于投資的書(shū)面資料。我閱讀的大多數(shù)內(nèi)容都使我著迷：我嘗試過(guò)親手畫(huà)圖，用市場(chǎng)標(biāo)記來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)股票走勢(shì)。我坐在經(jīng)紀(jì)公司的辦公室，看著股票報(bào)價(jià)帶卷動(dòng)，我還聽(tīng)評(píng)論員的講解。這些都是有趣的，但我并不為之顫抖，因?yàn)槲疫€什么都不懂。
相反地，本的想法能用簡(jiǎn)練易懂的平凡文字，有邏輯地去闡明（沒(méi)有希臘字母或復(fù)雜的公式）。對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)，關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)就是最新版第八章和第二十章的內(nèi)容，這些觀點(diǎn)引導(dǎo)著我今日的投資決策。
關(guān)于這本書(shū)的幾個(gè)有趣花絮：最新版包括了一個(gè)附錄，里面描述了一個(gè)未被提及的投資，是關(guān)于本的幸運(yùn)投資的。本在1948年，當(dāng)他寫(xiě)第一版書(shū)的時(shí)候進(jìn)行了收購(gòu)，注意了，這個(gè)神秘的公司就是政府雇員保險(xiǎn)公司Geico。如果本當(dāng)時(shí)沒(méi)有看出還處于初創(chuàng)期的Geico的特質(zhì)，我的未來(lái)和伯克希爾都將會(huì)大大的不同。
這本書(shū)1949年的版本還推薦了一個(gè)鐵路股，當(dāng)時(shí)賣(mài)17美元，每股盈利為10美元。（我佩服本的一個(gè)原因就是他有膽量使用當(dāng)前的例子，如果說(shuō)錯(cuò)了就會(huì)讓自己成為被嘲諷的對(duì)象。）某種程度上，低估值是由于當(dāng)時(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則造成的，那時(shí)候并不要求鐵路公司在賬面盈余中體現(xiàn)出子公司的大量盈余。
被推薦的股票就是北太平洋公司，它最重要的子公司是芝加哥,伯靈頓和昆西。這些鐵路現(xiàn)在是北伯林頓鐵路公司的重要組成部分，而伯克希爾現(xiàn)今完全擁有北伯林頓鐵路公司。當(dāng)我讀這本書(shū)的時(shí)候，北太平洋公司的市值約為4000萬(wàn)美元，現(xiàn)在它的繼承者每四天就能賺這么多了。
我已記不起當(dāng)時(shí)花了多少錢(qián)來(lái)買(mǎi)《聰明的投資者》的第一版。無(wú)論花了多少錢(qián)，都可以強(qiáng)調(diào)出本的格言：價(jià)格是你支付出去的，價(jià)值是你所獲得的。我做過(guò)的所有投資當(dāng)中，買(mǎi)本的書(shū)就是最好的投資（我買(mǎi)的那兩本結(jié)婚證除外）
原文如下：
Buffett’s annual letter: What you can learn from my real estate investments
“Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” –Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this essay because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small nonstock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath as in our recent Great Recession.
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming, and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop, and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to New York University that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped — this one involving commercial real estate — and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant — who occupied around 20% of the project’s space — was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
I joined a small group — including Larry and my friend Fred Rose — in purchasing the building. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our initial equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field — not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following — 1987 and 1994 — was of no importance to me in determining the success of those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings, whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings — and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his — and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state — how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits — and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there — do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
When Charlie Munger and I buy stocks — which we think of as small portions of businesses — our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings — which is usually the case — we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never forgone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
I have good news for these nonprofessionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th century, the Dow Jones industrial index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the nonprofessional should not be to pick winners — neither he nor his “helpers” can do that — but should rather be to own a cross section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
That’s the “what” of investing for the nonprofessional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’s observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to one another, neither the yields nor the prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the 10 years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s. (VFINX)) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors — whether pension funds, institutions, or individuals — who employ high-fee managers.
And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. These points guide my investing decisions today.
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and — brace yourself — the mystery company was Geico. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of Geico when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay; value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
